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Abstract
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of a national union, which coordinates the
wage negotiations in different industries, in a small open economy, trading in imperfectly
competitive world markets. Industry wage levels are determined as cooperative Nash
bargaining solutions on the labor demand curve. If wage contracts affect industry output
prices, a national union leads to wage moderation, higher employment, and lower
inflation. By generating inflation and by reducing aggregate and intermediate demand, a
wage increase in an industry causes a real income loss and unemployment for members
outside the industry. A national union takes this externality into account and settles for
a lower nominal wage than an industry-specific union would. Yet, if aggregate demand
policies systematically absorb part of the unemployment consequences of excessive wage
settlements, this conclusion could be reversed.

I. Introduction
In the current academic and non-academic debate about the causes of
unemployment in Europe, institutional aspects of the wage formation process have
received increasing attention. One of the recurring themes in this discussion relates real
wage restraint to the degree of centralization in the bargaining process between trade
unions and employers. The main hypothesis states that a more centralized wage setting
results in wage moderation, lower inflation, and higher employment. McCallum
(1983,1985), and Bruno and Sachs (1985) find some empirical support for this view. More
specifically, they claim that inflation-unemployment trade-offs have developed more
favorably in economies with a high degree of centralization than in economies with
decentralized wage setting.
Unfortunately, neither the exact meaning of centralization nor the relation
between centralization and labor market performance is made very clear in these empirical
studies. Most authors, including McCallum, and Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman (1983,
esp. pp. 27- 29) point to the presence in the economy of national unions which coordinate
the wage negotiations in different industries. A national union represents the interests of
workers in the whole economy and therefore takes into account the consequences of its
wage decisions in one industry on the rest of the economy. This would motivate the
national labor organization to set more reasonable wage goals although only Jackman
(1985) explores this link between a national union and wage restraint in somewhat greater
detail. None of the mentioned papers analyzes why and under what conditions a national
union in a small open economy would adopt a moderated wage policy. This lack of firm
theoretical basis is reflected in rather ad hoc empirical measures for the degree of
centralization. In addition, the recent severe unemployment problems in some countries
with strong national unions such as Belgium and the Netherlands are difficult to explain
without a deeper theoretical understanding of the effects of centralization.
This paper attempts to close some of the gap between theory and empirical
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evidence. More specifically, we analyze the impact of a national union in a multi-industry
open unionized economy with fixed exchange rates, trading on imperfectly competitive
world markets. Imperfect competition arises from product differentiation between foreign
and domestic industries. Labor negotiations between unions and employers determine the
wage levels in the economy. A distinction is made between a bargaining system with and
without a national union. In the so-called localized bargaining system, unions and
employer organizations are industry-specific. Wage negotiations address the concerns of
the industry involved. This system prevails in Great-Britain and Italy (Barkin, 1983 ).
In a coordinated bargaining system, the industry unions form part of a national union,
which coordinates the negotiations in different industries. We will assume throughout the
paper that wage agreements in this bargaining structure are concluded at the industry
level and that strikes are confined to the industry where negotiations have failed as would
be the case in Austria and Germany. Abraham (1987) provides the straightforward
extension to a bargaining system with national negotiations and strikes, which would be
more relevant for such countries as Sweden, Norway, and Belgium.
We will show that a national union is able to achieve a higher utility level than
an industry-specific union when wage contracts affect output prices. In that case, the
wage agreements have an indirect effect on aggregate consumption and intermediate
demand, and on the general price level. This further influences real wages and
employment in other industries. More specifically, a wage increase in one industry is
likely to reduce real wage and employment levels of union members in other industries and
thus creates a negative externality. A national union internalizes this externality and
adopts a more restrained bargaining strategy. This leads to higher employment and
aggregate output and to a lower general price level.
Government policies have a significant impact on the national union's incentive
for wage moderation. It is well-known from the work by Calmfors (1984,1985) and Drifflill
(1985), among others, that expansionary aggregate demand policies provide the union with
3
an incentive to bargain for a higher wage. No attention has yet been given to the
effectiveness of government policies in bargaining structures with different degrees of
centralization. We will argue that accommodating stabilization policies weaken and may
even reverse the national union's motivation for wage restraint as compared to a
bargaining system with industry-specific unions.
The analysis of a unionized economy requires a model that explicitly
integrates unions in the wage formation process. Most of the existing macroeconomic
literature in this area makes use of a model where unions set wages unilaterally ( see, for
instance, Jackman, 1985, Jackman and Layard, 1982, Nickell and Andrews, 1983, and
Layard and Nickell, 1985). This model does not take into consideration the role of
employers in the bargaining process and does not correspond to a reasonable description of
a bargaining game. A recent paper by Davidson (1985), concentrating on the
microeconomic analysis of bargaining structures in one oligopolistic industry, provides an
appropriate game-theoretic approach to modeling the bargaining systems considered here.
Davidson's game converges to a cooperative Nash bargaining solution. After presenting
the model of this paper in Section II, this solution is used in Section III to derive the wage
and employment outcomes in a localized and a coordinated bargaining system.
Subsequently, the main results are compared to the existing macroeconomic literature on
externalities in imperfectly competitive markets. Section IV analyzes the impact of a
national union when the government follows a known stabilization policy rule. Section V
contains a concluding summary.
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II. A General Equilibrium Model for a Small Open Unionized
Economy in Imperfectly Competitive World Markets
Assumptions of the model and profit maximization for an industry
In this section, we describe the model of imperfect competition, define the
general equilibrium in the economy, and derive the equilibrium levels of labor demand and
profits, assuming that wages have been set earlier during labor negotiations between
unions and employers.
We first describe the basic characteristics of the model which are the same for
the two bargaining structures. We consider a small open economy with m industries, all of
which are unionized. Each domestic industry contains a number of perfectly competitive
identical firms. The industry sells its output on the domestic and foreign market.
Exchange rates are fixed.
Bargaining in the economy takes place between union and employer
representatives and results in labor contracts specifying one wage for each industry, but
not the levels of employment. Once a wage agreement has been reached, all firms in the
industry choose their optimal labor input taking the negotiated wage as given. Total
employment in an industry i is determined as a point on the industry labor demand
curve.1 Labor and intermediate inputs are the only variable inputs in the production
process. The capital stock is fixed during the time of the labor contract which allows for
nonzero profits in the model.
The model of imperfect competition is kept as simple as possible. Four
fundamental assumptions are made. We first assume that the domestic and foreign
suppliers within the same industry sell similar but not identical products. This assumption
1We do not consider the alternative contract-curve model described in McDonald
and Solow (1981).
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is consistent with the empirical evidence which suggests that economic agents do not view
imports and domestic goods as perfect substitutes but distinguish the production of the
same industry according to the country of origin ( Deardorff and Stern, 1986 ). However,
world prices are independent of domestic supply. The domestic industry takes the price of
its foreign competitor as a given focal point, determined in the world market beyond its
control. Changes in the margin between the domestic and the world price causes demand
shifts between the domestic and foreign product. Consequently, industry product demand
depends on total domestic and foreign demand at each price level and, hence, on the
production levels in other domestic industries. This brings us to the other assumptions.
We assume that firms in an industry view the output and price levels of other industries
as independent of their own production decisions. Thirdly, each firm is assumed to be
small enough to view aggregate domestic and foreign demand as exogenously determined.
Finally, firms within one domestic industry act as perfect competitors once wages have
been set. These last three assumptions simplify the analysis considerably. The results of
this paper do not hinge on this simplification.
With these underlying assumptions we first derive the demand function facing
the industry. Demand for good i comes from four distinct sources. A part of industry i's
output is sold to domestic consumers. The utility of a representative consumer depends on
the consumption of produced goods and a non-produced good, called money. Aggregate
consumer demand for good i depends on its price, the import price of good i, the prices of
domestic and foreign substitutes and complements, consumption taxes and aggregate
private disposable income. For simplicity, we assume that all tax revenues in the domestic
economy are generated by one exogenously determined uniform consumption or value
added tax t. We also ignore foreign taxes and government transfers. Hence:
D~ = D ( p.,p ,M, Ad,
with D. = total real domestic consumption demand for good i;
1
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p. = domestic price of good i;
p_. = vector of prices of domestically produced goods
other than good i;
pM = vector of import prices;
F F.
= p R where p is a vector of world prices for the foreign products
and R is the fixed exchange rate;2
Ad = aggregate private disposable income.
An increase in p. lowers the domestic consumption of good i because of
substitution, income, and real balance effects.
Good i is further used as an intermediate input in the production of other
domestic industries. To derive an expression for intermediate demand we write the cost
function for a representative firm in industry j as:
M (1)
c. = c.(t., W., K., p., p _ ., p )
J J J J J J J
with w. = output level of the representative firm in industry j;
W. = Nominal wage in industry j;
K. = Capital stock in industry j;
p_. = vector of prices of domestic goods other than j.
The first derivative of the cost function with respect to pi yields the
representative firm's intermediate demand for good i (Varian, 1984, p.54 ). Aggregating
for all firms in industry j, and repeating the same steps for all industries other than i, we
obtain total intermediate demand for good i, X .
X. X (p.,y_.,W_.,p_.,K_,~
with y __, W _ .,K _i = vector of output levels, wages, and capital stocks
of industries other than i.
2Domestic currency per unit of world currency.
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An increase in pi, makes the use of domestic good i as an intermediate input less
attractive.
Government spending on good i, G., constitutes a third component of demand.
We assume that the government's policy rule is not systematically related to the
industry's employment situation. G. is therefore exogenous to the industry. This
assumption is relaxed later.
Finally, part of the domestic output of good i is sold to foreign consumers and
producers. Foreign economic agents base their decisions on foreign disposable income and
government spending, on the prices of all domestic and foreign goods expressed in foreign
currency, as well as on foreign wages and capital stocks.
d
Total demand for good i, y , is the sum of the various components of demand at
each price level. Hence,
d d d (2)
yi (p,p iy i 'R,K _,A ,G., t, F.)
where F. denotes a vector of all exogenously foreign variables determining the output of
industry i.
At the profit maximum for a representative firm in industry i price equals
marginal cost from which the supply function of the firm can be derived. Aggregating over
all firms yields industry i's supply function:
M()y.5= y.( W, pi, p _ , K., pM(
In equilibrium, industry demand equals industry supply. Solving for the equilibrium price
pi and substituting the result back in equation (3), we find the equilibrium output level in
industry i as:
* * d(4
y. =y. ( W., p ., y ., W ., R, K., K ., A , t, G., F. )
1 1 - 1 1 -1 1 1
Starred variables denote equilibrium values.
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Equilibrium labor demand, profits, and the consumer price index
We now derive the equilibrium levels for output, labor demand, profits, and the
consumer price index. General equilibrium requires that aggregate private wealth equals
aggregate disposable income. Assuming that all profit income is consumed, and that there
are no bonds in the economy, this implies that:
d m m
A = E W.N. + E I.+M (5a)
i=1 1i=1
with M = total equilibrium money holdings;
N. = the equilibrium employment level in industry i;
1
II. = the equilibrium profit level in industry i.
Taking the first derivative of the cost function with respect to W. at the equilibrium output
level y , we obtain equilibrium labor demand in industry i.
(6a)
N. =N.(y., W.,p., p ., p ,K.)
1 1 i 1 ' -1 1 .
Equilibrium profits are equal to
M (7a)
II. = Il(y., W ,p ,p_ .,p ,K")
1 i 1 1 1 1 1i
with y. defined in equation (4).
After substituting the expressions for N. and II. in equation (5a) and expressing
1 1
equilibrium prices as a function of output levels we obtain:
d d (5)
A = A (y , y.,W.,W .,WG.,- G .,V)i 1 1 -1 1 -1
with G _-i = government spending on domestic goods other than i;
V is used to simplify notation and defines the following a vector of exogenous variables:
V= [F. F . K.K . MR t]
1 -l 1 -1
where F _= foreign variables determining the output of
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domestic industries other than i.
Combining equations (4) and (5) we are able to define equilibrium industry output as a
function of other output levels, the wage structure in the economy and a set of exogenously
determined variables.
(8)
y. =v. (y _., W., W ., R, G., G .,V) for i = 1...m1 ~l - 1 -1 1 -1
Equation (8) defines a system of m equations in m unknowns. A Nash
equilibrium for the economy is achieved when each industry chooses its profit maximizing
output based on correct expectations about the equilibrium production levels in other
industries. The equilibrium describes the levels as a function of the negotiated wages and
all exogenous variables.
(9)
v. = v. (W.. W ., G..,G .,V)
1 '1 ' -1 1 -1
Finally, we substitute equation (9) in equations (6a) and (7a) for the equilibrium labor
demand and profit functions of industry i.
N. = N.( W., W ., G., G ., V) (6)
1 1 1 -1 l 1 -l
II.f=l.(W.,AW ., G., G ., V) (7)
1 1 1 -1 1 -1
A wage increase in industry i leads to a cutback in production which results in
additional lay-offs. At the contracted wage, profits must fall in response to a wage
increase because otherwise both unions and employers could be made better off by a higher
wage.
The wage increase in industry i also affects profits and employment in other
industries. The price and output adjustments to the wage change alter total revenue
generated in industry i. This revenue is paid out in factor income and profits and
constitutes a part of aggregate demand. A decline in revenue forces wage earners and
stockholders in industry i to consume less and reduces the industry's purchases of
intermediate goods from other industries. The Technical Appendix shows that total
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revenue in industry i falls in response to a wage increase if :




with 1 ,. 7 i h= absolute value of the wage elasticity of labor demand,
profits, and intermediate cost in industry i;
6., 6,6 = share of labor, profit, and intermediate factor income
in total revenue of industry i.
Symons and Layard (1983) for six OECD countries, and Dreze and Modigliani (1981) for
Belgium, estimate the wage elasticity of labor demand, q., to be larger than 1.3 This
empirical evidence suggests that the above inequality holds even in the extreme case of
both ."andr7. equal to zero. Hence, wage gains reduce factor income and, through their
1 1
negative impact on consumption and intermediate demand, worsen demand conditions for
other industries.
The price increase of good i, resulting from the higher wage in industry i, leads
to additional adjustments in intermediate and consumption demand. Complements of good
i experience a further decline in demand which reinforces the revenue effects of the wage
increase. The demand for gross substitutes goes up in response to the higher price of good
i. Potentially, strong substitution effects could dominate the negative demand
consequences of the reduced factor income although this would be the exception rather
than the rule. After all, products of different industries rather than similar goods,
produced by firms within the same industry, are considered here. In open, internationally
trading European economies, most demand shifts occur between products of the same
foreign and domestic industries : firms compete with other firms within the same domestic
3. measures the wage elasticity of labor demand taking output adjustments into
account. Most empirical studies estimate the constant-output labor-demand elasticity
which is much smaller and is found to be in the .15-. 5 range ( Hamermesh, 1984 ).
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industry and with foreign companies producing similar products. Products of other
domestic industries are more likely to be complements. For example, when an inflationary
wage agreement makes Swedish cars more expensive, consumers may switch to other
modes of transportation but will, more likely, buy cheaper Japanese and German cars. In
its turn, the Swedish steel industry is harmed by the slower sales of Volvo's and Saabs
and is only partially compensated by orders coming from bus or train producing
companies.
We conclude that a wage increase in one industry negatively affects profits
an. ON.
J J
and employment in most or all other industries (- and - 5 0 for most or all i and j ).
1 1
These spill-over effects of a wage change create a link between the wage decisions in
different industries and are crucial for our further analysis.
Finally, it can be seen from equations (2), (5), and (9) that the equilibrium
consumer price index Pc depends on the same variables as equilibrium output.
P =P (\W.,W .,G.. G ., V) (10)
c c l' -1 1 -1
Rising wages decrease industry output, push up output prices, and generate domestic
inflation.
III. Wages and Employment in an Economy With and Without a National Union
A localized bargaining system
We now derive the outcome of the wage bargaining between industry-specific
union and employer organizations in a localized bargaining system. During the
negotiations, both parties take into account the consequences of their wage decisions for
employment, profits, and inflation. It is assumed that they know the true structure of the
economy as described in the previous pages.
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What goals is the union trying to achieve? In the literature on union
behavior, it is common to represent the union's utility as a concave function of real wages
and employment ( see Oswald, 1982
U. = U.(w.,N.)





The employer organization maximizes joint industry profits of all firms in industry i, II..
What will be the outcome of the negotiation process?
Davidson ( 1985 ) models a sequential bargaining game between unions and
employers for a localized bargaining system in a two industry economy.4 Employers and
unions in each industry make alternating offers. Davidson proves that equilibrium wages
are completely determined by what happens in the subgames in which the wage in one
industry has been accepted, or is expected to be accepted, while bargaining in the other
industry continues. Lately, there has been substantial progress in dealing with two-person
bargaining models with this structure, following the strategic approach developed by
Rubinstein (1982). It can be proven that a unique pair of equilibrium wages exists and
that, when the period between offers and counteroffers becomes very small and the
discount factors of the union and employers are the same, the wage outcome converges to
the symmetric Nash cooperative bargaining solution.5
The Nash cooperative solution depends on the rewards for both parties in the
case when a labor contract is signed and on the payoffs when no agreement can be
4An extension of Davidson's model to m sectors would go far beyond the present
effort of this paper. We shall proceed accordingly on the presumption that the support for
the Nash cooperative solution in the m =2 case justifies its use in the more general case
and that, in itself, the analysis of a two-industry economy is worthwhile enough to pursue
further.
5The Nash bargaining solution has been used in the trade union literature by
Nickell (1982), and Pissarides (1985). Horn and Wolinsky (1985) present the only
application of Davidson's game-theoretic framework we are aware of.
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reached. In a localized bargaining system, the union in industry i achieves a utility level
U. (w., N. ) when a wage agreement is reached. In that case, the employers in industry i
1 1 1
make a profit of II.. During a strike, the firms earn no profits and the union's utility is U. (
11
0,0 ) which is normalized to be zero.* The Nash cooperative bargaining solution for
industry i is found by maximizing the product of the gains each party achieves by not




max Zm = U.(-,N.(W.,W ., G., G.,V)). II. (W.,W .,G.,G .,V)
1 1P 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1
c
with respect to the wage W. with P defined in equation (10).
1 C
The first-order conditions for an interior solution become:'
BZm dU.
1 1 an
- - II. + U. - =0 (11)




with - = [ ( 1 - E. ) -sU ]




and E. =-- - = elasticity of the consumer price index
BW. P
1c
with respect to a change in the nominal wage of industry i;
s. = absolute value of the slope of the labor demand curve
1
6Strike funds or other income streams for striking union members could easily be
integrated into the analysis.
71t is assumed that, in all industries, the contracted wage exceeds the reservation
wage of employed workers. During the period of the wage contract the employed do not
accept a job in another industry. This is a reasonable description of the European situation
where high mobility costs and generous unemployment benefits result in virtually no short
run labor mobility. Relaxing this assumption does not change the conclusions of the paper
( see Abraham, 1987 )
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Equation (11) is equivalent to
dU. W. II. W.
I i i 1 (11b)
dW. U. OW. I.
1 1 1 1
Equation (11b) says that, at the optimal wage, the union's gain from a 1% wage increase
equals the employer's loss from the higher wage. If a small wage change significantly
improves industry profits with only minor utility losses for the union, the prevailing wage




The marginal utility of a wage increase, -, depends on the magnitude of s.
dW.
1
and E.. A steeper labor demand curve (a smaller s. ) diminishes the employment costs of a
1 1
wage increase for the union. As a consequence, a wage increase is more beneficial to the
union than harmful to the employer and thus a higher wage is needed to achieve
equilibrium. The link between nominal wages and inflation (as reflected in e. ) is a source
of wage moderation. By putting pressure on the industry price level, a nominal wage
increase causes domestic inflation, which reduces the marginal utility of a nominal wage
increase for the union.
A coordinated bargaining system
We now consider a coordinated bargaining structure where the industry unions
form a part of a national union but continue to bargain at the industry level. The goal of
m
the union is to maximize the sum of the union's utilities in all industries, E U. ( w., N. ).
i. 1 l' 1
An analogous but algebraically more complex analysis could be repeated for the case
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where the national union maximizes a general welfare function G (U1,..., Um ). The
employer organization is assumed to be industry-specific and maximizes industry profits
m
II.. The analogous case of a national employer organization, maximizing E II., is
i=1
analyzed in Abraham (1987).
In Davidson's game for a coordinated bargaining system, the same union offers
and accepts wages in all industries. As before, equilibrium wages are determined by the
subgames in which industry negotiators know the ( expected) settlements in the rest of
the economy. Wages are found by applying the symmetric Nash cooperative bargaining
solution.
The derivation of the wage outcome in industry i requires the correct
specification of the disagreement outcome for the national union. A strike causes a
temporary shutdown in industry i. This production stop results in excess demand for
product i and drives up the price of good i as well as the consumer price index.
Furthermore, employees receive no wage income during the strike and shareholders earn
no dividends, so that aggregate disposable income and consumption in the economy falls.
Finally, other industries are not able to sell part of their production as intermediate inputs
to industry i. Thus, real wages and employment outside industry i indirectly suffer from
the strike. The union's utility levels in other industries are therefore lower than when the
0
employer and union in sector i sign a labor contract. Denote U. as the utility in sector j
J
0




bargaining in industry i is E U. with U. s U. (-, N. ) for all j. A labor contract in




industry i thus yields a utility gain of U. [ -, N. ] + E2 [ U. ( -, N. ) - U. ] in
c c
comparison to a strike.
The industry-specific employer organization earns II. with, and no profits
1
without a wage contract. The Nash solution for industry i follows from maximizing the
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max Zmc = [U.[--, N. ] + E [ U. (-, N.) - U. ] ] x H.
i ip I jai J P J J
c c
with respect to W.. N., N., II. and P are defined in equations (6), (7) and (10).
1 1 j 1 c
This yields,
6Z me BZm dU. all.
Hi m dJ 1 im o
_ -- -I. -- + -- [U. - U. ]=0 (12)
BW\. BW. 1 j i dW. BW. ja i J J
1 1 1 1
dU. U .W. ON.
m j m w,j j m j
with E- = E--E. + E U -
jai dW. jai P W.T ji NjW
1 c 1 1
In proposition 1, we compare the solutions for a localized and coordinated bargaining
system.
PROPOSITION 1: Under general conditions (to be specified below ), nominal wages in
each industry are lower and employment is higher in a coordinated than in a localized
bargaining system. Moreover, a localized bargaining structure leads to a higher general




a. Evaluate in (12) at the optimal wage W. that would prevail in a
m
1
localized bargaining system. Since - = 0 at W., the first part of equation (12) drops
OW.1
1
out and we obtain:
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I I I
U . W. ON. an.
m w,j j, m J 1 m , o
- 1. E --- E.X+\. E UN.--+ -- E[U. - U. ] (12b)
P VW. BW. BW.
c 1 1 1
A prime denotes that the function is evaluated at W.. Since the second-order conditions for
1
2Zmc




when the expression in (12b) is smaller than or equal to zero. The wage must then be










discussed before, -- 0 for all or most i and j, so that (12b) is negative and proposition
OW.
(1) holds. Only in exceptional cases, a wage increase in industry i would stimulate
m
employment in the rest of the economy. Even then, W. only exceeds W. when E UN.
1 1 .. NJ
ON.
J
- is large enough to dominate the negative terms in equation (12b). This seems unlikely
OW.
1
for any particular industry and very improbable for a large enough number of industries to
reverse the basic result of proposition 1.
b. With lower nominal wages, firms hire additional workers and produce more.
Finally, wage moderation in all sectors results in a lower general price level.
Proposition 1 is best explained by referring to the well known concept of
negative externalities. The wage increase of one industry raises the general price level for
everyone and, in this way, creates a negative externality for workers in other industries.
The total utility loss of the real wage reduction for workers outside industry i is measured
by the first term of equation (12b). The wage increase also reduces aggregate disposable
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income and intermediate demand which causes economy-wide unemployment. The second
term of equation (12b) reflects the utility cost of this decline in employment for union
members who are employed in industries other than i. An industry-specific union does not
care about the negative repercussions of its wage decision on other unions' utilities. A
national union internalizes the externality because it represents workers in the whole
economy. In order to keep inflation and unemployment under control, it bargains for a
lower nominal wage. An industry-specific union has no incentive to moderate its wage
demands because, as long as other industries do not follow its example, such unilateral
wage moderation would lower its utility.
In the recent macroeconomic literature on trade unions only Jackman (1985)
makes related externality arguments.8 He only considers aggregate demand
externalities in a closed economy consisting of two perfectly competitive industries with
constant-returns-to-scale technologies using labor as the only variable production factor.
In this set-up, the marginal product of labor and hence the real wage is at a technologically
determined fixed level. Aggregate demand depends exclusively on the level of real money
balances. The unions in each industry set the nominal wage unilaterally and thus
indirectly determine prices, real money balances, aggregate demand and employment. If
they collude, they would set the money wages at the level that would guarantee full
employment. Otherwise, they reach a noncooperative Nash equilibrium with higher
money wages, and thus lower real money balances and lower employment.
In contrast to Jackman's results, we find that the national union's incentive for
wage restraint disappears in perfectly competitive world markets. When prices and
demand are determined abroad, the wage setting in one industry has no impact on union
dU.
members elsewhere in the economy. Mathematically, -- is zero and U. = U. for all j i.
, j j
dW.
8although his paper primarily concentrates on the persistence of monetary shocks
in a unionized economy with staggered wage setting.
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Hence, equation (12b) is equal to zero. The first-order conditions for a localized and a
coordinated bargaining system are the same.
The contradiction between the two papers is the consequence of the
informational asymmetry implicit in Jackman's set-up. In his model, union leaders realize
that a higher wage in one industry decreases real money balances and employment in the
other industry while employers do not. It is never explained why union negotiators would
be better informed nor do employers play any role in the wage determination process. In
effect, Jackman ignores the entire bargaining process by assuming that unions set wages
unilaterally. There is no attempt to assure the consistency between the employer's
production decisions and bargaining behavior.
While Proposition 1 requires that the wage contract in one industry influences
union members elsewhere, it is true for a far wider range of market and information
structures than the ones considered in this paper. For instance, wage settlements in one
industry would continue to cause real wage and employment adjustments in other
industries, when the employer organization controls the output level of the individual firms
and, as a multi-plant monopolist, sets marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. In
conjectural variations models with endogenous aggregate demand or/and Stackelberg
industry leaders, the interindustry links would be at least as strong as before. Likewise,
full knowledge of the structure of the economy is a sufficient but not necessary condition
for proposition 1 to hold. One could assume that only the national organizations, operating
in the whole economy, fully understand the repercussions of a wage settlement. In this
reasoning, bargaining parties in a localized bargaining system do not realize that a wage
increase in their industries hurts union members elsewhere. They therefore agree on a
higher wage than if they were better informed. Consequently, the findings of proposition 1
would be reinforced.
In a different context, externalities in imperfectly competitive markets have
recently attracted renewed interest among macroeconomists. Papers by Akerlof and
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Yellen (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985), Hart (1982), and Drazen (1987), among
others, have revived the fundamental Keynesian idea that the real level of activity in an
economy may be too low. Equilibrium prices and wages are higher in an imperfectly than
in a perfectly competitive equilibrium so that aggregate production is below the socially
optimal level. Given other prices and wages, individual wage and price setters have no
incentive to decrease their own price or wage. However, if all price and wage setters
would decrease their prices and wages simultaneously, aggregate demand and social
welfare would rise. Aggregate demand policies, which bring the economy closer to the
perfectly competitive outcome, may be welfare improving.
Our results fit in well with some of the aspects of this research. It becomes
clear that institutional features of the labor market influence the gap between the privately
and socially optimal output. By simultaneously narrowing the mark-up of the nominal
wage over the reservation wage in all industries, the national union moves the economy
towards the social optimum. In part, the national union therefore acts as a substitute for
aggregate demand management. In this interpretation, the strong support of most
European governments for labor negotiations between ational employer and labor
organizations makes a good deal of sense.
Finally, Proposition 1 throws a different light on the effects of a wage
indexation system. Indexing wages to consumer prices provides wage earners with
automatic protection against inflation. In negotiating an industry wage agreement, a
national union does not have to worry about hurting the real income of workers outside the
industry and this diminishes the motivation for wage moderation. Wage indexation thus
neutralizes part of the employment benefits of having a national union.
IV. National Unions and Endogenous Government Policies
In this section, we relax the assumption that unions and employers consider
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government policies to be independent of the outcome of their wage negotiations. Instead,
the government follows a known simple "Keynesian" stabilization policy. If aggregate
employment falls below the government's target level, it expands its purchases of domestic
goods in proportion to the gap between actual and target employment. This policy rule
resembles the specification in Calmfors (1984), Calmfors and Horn (1985, 1986), and
Driffill (1985), and is summarized as follows:
G.= G. (N., N .) for i = 1,...m (13)
1 1 1 -l
We only consider the situation where aggregate employment falls short of the target rate.
0G. 0G. 0G.
1 1 1
For this range - and - 0 where is a vector of first derivatives of G. with
1N. BN .-iON.
1 - 1 -1
&G.
respect to all employment levels outside of industry i. The fact that 5 0 indicates
ON .
-1
that the government also stimulates the production of industry i when employment falls
elsewhere. With aggregate demand policies, all or most industries benefit from a fiscal
expansion. For simplicity, the financing of the policy is not considered here. It can be
shown that the results of this section hold for a wide range of tax systems as long as
increasing government expenditures stimulates employment.
With the above policy rule, wage contracts between union and employers have
an impact on government spending through their impact on employment. Large wage
increases lead to unemployment which triggers expansionary fiscal policies.
Mathematically, this is seen by using equations (6) and (13) to express government
expenditures as a function of wages and all relevant exogenous variables.
G.=G.(W.,W .,V) (14)
1 1 1 -1
0G.
1
with-- > 0 for all i and j.
BW.
We now analyze the wage determination in a localized bargaining system
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assuming that the union and the employer take the policy rule into account. Equation (14)
is an additional constraint for industry negotiators during the bargaining process. In all
other respects, the bargaining problem is identical to the previous case of a localized
bargaining system with an independent government. The bargaining outcome for industry
i is derived from the following maximization process:
w.
d 1 d d




with respect to W., subject to the government rule in equation (14), and subject to
d d dequations (6), (7) and (10) for N., U. and P . The superscript d indicates that the
1 1 c
government policy depends on the wage outcomes in the economy.
This maximization problem is solved by first substituting the policy rule in the labor
demand, profit, and consumer price functions. Subsequently, the obtained expressions for
N., II., and P are substituted in the objective functions and maximized with respect to W..
1 1' c
The first-order conditions for a maximum are:
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Equation (15) shows the effects of the policy rule. The - term corresponds to the first-
OW.
order conditions for a localized bargaining system with an independent government ( see
equation (11) ). When the labor contract in industry i does not take the stabilization policy
m
into consideration, - is zero at the optimal wage. The remainder of the equation
BW.
measures the impact of the government response to a wage change in industry i. The
second term of equation (15) reflects the inflationary consequences of the policy rule for the
union's marginal utility. The government effort to reduce unemployment generates
inflation and therefore decreases the benefit of a nominal wage gain for union members.
The third term measures the union's utility of the higher employment in industry i. By
expanding public sector expenditures, the policy reduces the employment loss of a wage
increase for the union. In general, we would expect the utility benefits of the employment
expansion to outweigh the inflationary cost. In this case, the part of equation (15) that
represents union preferences is positive. With the stabilization policy, the union would then
bargain for higher wages. As seen in the last term of equation (15), the expansionary
government policies further offsets some of the profit losses from the wage increase. This
diminishes the employer's resistance against wage concessions. As a result, the union and
the employer exploit the government's willingness to absorb some of the employment
consequences of a wage increase by setting the wage above the level they would otherwise
choose. This point was first made by Calmfors (1984).
We now discuss the national union's response to the government policy rule in
a coordinated bargaining system. The set-up of the bargaining problem is similar to
the analysis of a coordinated bargaining system with exogenous government policies.
0
Denoting U. as the disagreement outcome in industry j, the cooperative Nash bargaining
J
solution for a coordinated bargaining system is found by maximizing:
W. W.
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To compare the negotiated wage in the two bargaining systems, we determine
dc d
1 1
the sign of - at the wage in a localized bargaining system, that is when - = 0. Q. is
W. OW.
1 1
negative and summarizes the national union's motivation for wage moderation in an
ame BZ mz. 8.
1 1
economy with an independent government ( compare Q. to - -- ). The rest of
8W. BW.
1 1
equation (16) measures the impact of the government policy on the utility of union
members outside industry i. The fiscal accommodation results in new jobs throughout the
economy at the cost of more inflation. When the employment effects dominate, a wage
increase in one industry creates a positive externality for union members in the whole
economy. If this positive externality outweighs the union's reasons for wage restraint, a
coordinated bargaining system is characterized by higher wages and lower employment
~de d
1 1
than in a localized bargaining system ( -- - -- would then be positive ). In any event,
BW. 8W.
1 1
accommodating aggregate demand policies reduce the national union's incentive for wage
moderation. The benefits of the fiscal expansion, following a wage increase in one
Y
25
industry, are not confined to that industry. For this reason, the national labor and
employer organization exploit the policy rule more thoroughly than an industry-specific
organization would.
For similar reasons a strictly nonaccommodating policy would strengthen the
wage moderation by a national union. Consider a government which uses aggregate
demand policies for correcting trade balance deficits and maintaining an acceptable rate of
inflation. The national union realizes that the government restricts its expenditures on all
goods if wage contracts result in a trade deficit or in unacceptable inflation. This would
hurt all union members in the economy. For this reason, the national union bargains for
lower wages than in a localized bargaining system.
V. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the wage and employment consequences of centralized
bargaining in a small open unionized economy with fixed exchange rates and imperfectly
competitive world markets. A distinction was made between a bargaining system with
and without a national union. A multi-industry model was developed which integrated the
different bargaining structures. In this model, wages are determined as the solution to a
symmetric Nash cooperative bargaining game and employment is found as the point on the
labor demand curve corresponding to the contracted wage level. The model was used to
analyze whether the presence of a national union achieves wage moderation and higher
employment levels.
We found this to be true under two well-defined conditions. First of all, the
country should possess some degree of market power in the world market. When demand
conditions and inflation are primarily determined abroad, national and industry-specific
organizations sign similar wage agreements. Only with significant linkages among
industries and when domestic demand constitutes an important component of total
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demand, a national union takes into account the negative economy-wide repercussions of
an industry wage agreement and settles for a lower nominal wage. Secondly, the national
union should bear the full employment and inflationary cost of a wage increase.
Accommodating government policies and wage indexation schemes achieve the opposite
result and reduce the national union's incentive for wage restraint.
These findings should caution against any explanation of European
unemployment based on simple cross-country correlations between centralization in
bargaining and labor market performance. The potential role of a national union depends
on a wide range of institutional and structural characteristics of the economy and on the
choice of government policy. For this reason, a more detailed country by country approach
seems more promising for future research in this area. One could analyze whether the
economic structure of a particular country provides the national union with an incentive
for wage restraint. This would amount to measuring the impact of industry wages on the
general price level and on employment levels in other industries. Also, shifts in bargaining
and policy regimes can be studied. Belgium, for instance, had a tradition of strong
national organizations and nationally determined labor contracts but in the mid-seventies
shifted towards a system of regional and industry-specific negotiations. At about the same
time, the government embarked on an accommodation policy of the post-oil-shock
recession. These developments coincided with a dramatic deterioration of the employment
situation which is generally explained by a surprising lack of real wage moderation.
Finally, this paper has some implications for government policy. The support
of most European governments for centrally determined labor contracts makes sense
insofar as the government retains its independence in conducting policies. This implies a
delicate balance of power which seems to have prevailed during the fifties and the sixties
in most European countries with strong national unions. But, in the seventies, the
national unions in countries such as Belgium, The Netherlands, and Denmark used their
political influence to avoid wage concessions. Expansionary demand policies resulted in
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mounting budget deficits but were not able to prevent sharp increases in unemployment.
The German government, on the other hand, adhered to a strict nonaccommodating policy
in the seventies and experienced the smallest increases of the unemployment rate of all
EEC countries excluding Luxembourg. It thus appears that a government commitment to
maintain external equilibrium and low inflation may be necessary to moderate excess wage
demands in countries with powerful national unions. The austerity programs, which were
adopted in the early eighties by several smaller European countries with centralized




We define total revenue, TR., as TR. = W.N. + II. + H. + FC. with H. = total
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intermediate cost in industry i and FC. = total fixed costs in industry i.
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production lowers the quantity of intermediate inputs demanded by industry i. The
negative repercussions on demand for other industries lowers the prices of intermediate
goods, which reinforces the decline in intermediate cost for industry i.
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